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ABSTRACT
CONSISTENCY AND POPULATION MONOTONICITY OF IN 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS
Özgür Yılmaz 
Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Tank Kara 
August 1999
In this study, we analyze consistency and population monotonicity principles fo­
cusing on the pairwise stability solution in social and economic networks. First, it 
is examined which allocation rules and value functions lead to the consistent pair­
wise stable graphs. Second, population monotonic allocation rules with respect to 
the pairwise stability solution are analyzed.
Keywords; Consistency, population monotonicity, allocation rule, value function, 
pairwise stability.
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ÖZET
SOSYAL VE EKONOMİK AĞLARDA TUTARLILIK VE NÜFUS
TEKDÜZENLİĞİ
Özgür Yılmaz 
iktisat Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Asst. Prof. Tarık Kara 
Ağustos 1999
Bu çalışmada tutarlılık ve nüfus tekdüzenliliğini inceledik. Burada odak noktası 
olarak sosyal ve ekonomik ağlardaki ikili (zayıf) denge çözümü ele alındı. İlk olarak, 
ikili dengeyi tutarlı kılan paylaştırma kuralları ve değer fonksiyonları üzerinde du­
ruldu. İkinci olarak ise, ikili dengeye göre nüfus tekdüzenliliği arzeden paylaştırma 
kuralları analiz edildi.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tutarlılık, nüfus tekdüzenliliği, paylaştırma kuralı, değer fonksiy­
onu, ikili denge.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
A network structure or graph describes the interaction between agents. Here, the 
nodes represent the agents and an arc exists between two nodes if the correspond­
ing agents interact bilaterally (by a graph we mean an undirected graph, hence 
unilateral interactions will not be considered in this work). The setting is that 
multiple links between any two agents are not allowed and an agent cannot have 
one or more links onto himself.
In the context of graph structures, the need arises to give predictions concerning 
which networks are likely to form (this leads to the stability notion). Self-interested 
agents can choose to form new links or severe existing links(costs associated with 
these are assumed to be zero). The specification is that a value function gives the 
value of each graph or network, while an allocation rule gives the distribution of 
value to the individual players forming the network. (Jackson and Wolinsky,1996) 
With this specification, the question arises at the stability notion. The definition of
a stable graph embodies the idea that the agents have the right to form or severe 
links. The formation of a link requires the consent of both agents involved, but 
severance can be done unilaterally.
Many social networks such as information transmission, roads between towns, 
computer networks, internal organization of firms, etc. can be modelled with graph 
structures having the above setting.
We will analyze two axioms, consistency and population monotonicity, in the 
domain of graph structures.
In most of social choice theory, game theory, and economic theory the number 
of agents is assumed to be a fixed number and this number is not allowed to 
vary. The other alternative is to define solutions for problems involving groups of 
different number of agents. When a solution is defined in this way, the problem 
arises at the relation between its components of different groups of some(different) 
number of agents, and this is the question what consistency deals with: how should 
the components of solutions be linked across cardinalities?
An informal description of the consistency principle is the following: a solution 
is consistent if for any admissible problem, whenever it recommends some outcome 
X as its solution outcome, then it recommends the restriction of x to any subgroup 
as the solution outcome of the reduced problem faced by this subgroup: this is 
the problem obtained from the original one by attributing to the members of the 
complementary subgroup their components of a;.(Thomson,1996)
The concept of the reduced problem is crucial in understanding consistency 
principle. Given a problem D G {T>^  represents the class of problems that the 
members of N  could face), and an alternative x in the feasible set of D, the reduced 
problem of D relative to the subgroup N' of N and x is the problem comprising all
the alternatives of D at which the members of the complementary subgroup N \N '  
receive their components of x. (Thomson,1996) So, once the problem D G has 
been solved at x by applying the solution </?, the problem appears to the members of 
the subgroup N' in such a way that the members in the complementary subgroup 
N \ N '  receive the payoffs xn\n' assigned to them by </?. The interpretation is that 
the agents are promised specific welfare levels and certain payoffs are paid to them 
when leaving.
Another property is population monotonicity. The question is whether the 
agents are affected in the same direction as their circumstances change (Thom­
son, 1994), e.g. the case of newcomers. The number of agents is allowed to vary and 
solutions are investigated for admissible cardinalities. The axiom of population 
monotonicity is meant to help us relate the recommendations made by solutions 
as the number of agents varies. (Thomson, 1994)
In this work we investigate the consistency and population monotonicity prin­
ciples where the agents are endowed with graph structures. The solution concept 
we use here is the pairwise stability which is a relatively weak notion. In the next 
chapter, we present the allocation rules and value functions under which the pair­
wise stability is consistent. In the third chapter our concern will be the population 
monotonicity. We conclude in chapter four.
Chapter 2
Consistency of Pairwise Stability  
Solution in Social and Economic
N et works
2.1 Basic Notations and Definitons
2,1.1 G raphs, Value Function , A llocation  R ule, and S ta­
b ility
Let N be the finite set of players. The network relations among these players are 
formally represented by graphs whose nodes are identified with the players and 
whose arcs capture the pairwise relations.
The complete graph, denoted , is the set of all subsets of N of size 2. The 
set of all possible graphs on N is then — {g\g C g^}. Let ij  denote the subset 
of N  containing i and j  and is referred to as the link ij. The interpretation is that
if ij G g, then nodes i and j  are directly connected, while if ij ^ g, then nodes i 
and j  are not directly connected^.
Let g + ij  denote the graph obtained by adding the link ij to the existing graph 
g and g — ij  denote the graph obtained by deleting the link ij from the existing 
graph g (i.e. g + ij = gU {i j}  and g - i j  = g \  {¿j}).
Let g |5 = {ij  G p|z G 5  and j  G 5} for 5  C denote the restriction of the 
graph g to S.
Let N{g) — s.t. ij  G denote the set of agents linked to some other 
agent(s) and n{g) be the cardinality of N{g)·, Ds{g) = {f G S\$j G N \ { i ]  s.t. ij G 
g} and ds{g) be the cardinality of Ds{g)· Note that DN{g) represents the discon­
nected agents in g and hence N{g) = N \  DN{g).
A path is a non-empty graph of the form p =  {xqXi ,XiX2, ■ ■ ■ ,Xk-i'Xk} where 
N' =  {xo, ■ · ·, Xk] is  ^subset of N.
The graph g' C g is a, component of g, if for all i G N(g') and j  G N(g'), i ^  j, 
there exists a path in g' connecting i and j ,  and for any i G N(g') and j  G N{g), 
ij G g implies that ij G g'.
The value function of a graph is represented by u ; {^1  ^ C M. The set
of all such functions is V.
An allocation rule Y : {g\g C g ^ }x V  —>■ describes how the value associated
with each network is distributed to the individual players. (The set of all such 
allocation rules is y.) u) is the payoff to player i from graph g under the value 
function V.
^The graphs analyzed here are non-directed. That is, it is not possible for one individual to 
link to another, without having the second individual also linked to the first, and furthermore, 
multiple links between any two agents and an agent having link(s) onto himself are not allowed 
as stated in the previous section.
Now we need to define a notion which captures the stability of a network. The 
definition of a stable graph embodies the idea that the agents have the right to 
form or severe links. The formation of a link requires the consent of both agents 
involved, but severance can be done unilaterally. Here, the cost of formation and 
severance is assumed to be zero as stated in the introduction.
Definition 1 A graph g is pairwise stable respect to v and Y  if
(i) for all ij e g, Yi{g, v) > Yi{g -  ij, v) and Yj{g, v) > Yj{g -  ij, v) and
(ii) for all ij  ^ g, if Yi{g, v) < Yi{g + ij, t;) then Yj{g, v) > Yj{g + ij, v).
We shall say that g is defeated by g' ii g' = g — ij and (i) is violated for ij, or 
if ^ + ij  and (ii) is violated for ij.
Now, we will define some restrictions on Y  and v.
Definition 2 Given a permutation tt : N —>■ N, let g'^  — {ij\i =  n{k),j  =  
kl E g}. Let v'^  be defined by v' {^g' )^ =v{g).
Definition 3 The allocation rule Y  is anonymous if, for any permutation tt,
yn{i){g'',v )^ =  Yi{g,v).
Anonymity states that if all that has changed is the names of the agents (and 
not anything concerning their relative positions or production values), then the 
allocations they receive should not change. In other words, the anonymity of Y 
requires that the information used to decide on allocations be obtained from the 
function V and the structure of g, and not from the label of the individual.
Definition 4 An allocation rule is balanced if Yi{g, v) =  v(g) for all v and g.
A stronger notion of balance, component balance, requires Y  to allocate re­
sources generated by any component to that component. Let C(g) denote the set 
of components of g.
Definition 5 A value function v is component additive if v{g) = Y^ ç^^ cig) ^(^)·
Definition 6 The rule Y  is component balanced if Xlieiv(/i) ~
every g and h G C{g) and component additive v.
Note that the definition of component balance only applies when v is component 
additive. Otherwise balancedness will be contradicted.
Definition 7 The value function v is anonymous if v{g^) =  v{g) for all permu­
tations 7T and graphs g.
Definition 8 The value function v satisfies monotonicity if for all g E G, for all 
i , j  G N, v{g -I- ij) > v{g), and satisfies strict monotonicity if for all g E G, for all 
i , j  E N, v{g + ij) > v{g).
There are two basic allocation rules: equal split rule and the Shapley value. The 
equal split rule is the simplest one and allocates the value of a graph (the value of 
the component if v is component additive) equally among the agents involved in 
that graph (component):
Definition 9 The equal split rule, Y, is defined as follows:
Y ) where i E N{h) and h E C{g) if v is component additive
^  for all i 6 N{g) otherwise
The Shapley value allocates the value considering each agent’s marginal con­
tribution:
Definition 10 The TU-game U in characteristic function form is defined as fol­
lows: given (v,g), Uy^ g{S) =  Z)/iec(s|s) S C N. The Shapley value of
a game U is SKi(i/) = Esclvv(C'(SU {i}) -
2.1.2 C onsisten cy
The consistency principle applies to social networks as follows:
Definition 11 Given a value function v, and an allocation rule Y,  the solution 
V? : y X y  —)·  ^ is complement consistent with respect to v and Y  if for every
g € ip{Y, v) and for every N' C N, we have ^ |iv'G (p{Y, v) where
S (5 ')= o(s'U ( 5 \ s U0 ) -  E  V s 'e G " ' (2,1)
ieN\N‘
Definition 12 Given a value function v, and an allocation rule Y , the solution 
(/?: y X y  —> is max consistent with respect to v and Y  if for every g e  (p{Y, v) 
and for every N' C N, we have g |iv/G (p{Y,v) where
v{g') =  max{v{g'U g") -  ^  Yi{g,v)\ g" 0 }  \ / g ' e G ^ '  (2.2)
ieN\N'
The max consistency can be defined in various ways: the reduced value function 
(2.2) can be modified as:
u((/') = max{u(i/'Up") -  ^  li(i?.'^)l 9" \n'= 0 }  ^g' eG^'  (2.3)
ieN{g")\N'
I^n this analysis we simply take (p as the pairwise stability solution
2.2 Results
We will assume that the disconnected agents receive zero-payoff and the value of 
a graph is zero if and only if it is empty, i.e. Yi{g,v) =  0 for all i e DN{g) and 
v{g) = 0 if and only if ^ = 0.
Lemma 1 If p is a pairwise stable graph, and allocation rule is equal split, then
dN{g) < 2.
Proof: Assume that p is a pairwise stable graph and djv(p) > 2. Now take any 
i , j  G DN{g). Then, Yi{g,v) = Yj{g,v) = 0 due to the above assumption. If v is
not component additive, then Yi{g -1- ij, v) = Yj{g + ij, v) = -^ 1^ +2 ^  otherwise
{ij 
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Contradiction.
we have Yi[g ij, v) = Yj{g -t- ij, v) = > 0. In either case, g + ij  defeats g.
Proposition 1 Let <p x V  be the pairwise stability solution. If v is not
component additive and Y  is the equal split rule, then the solution cp is complement 
consistent with respect to v and Y.
Proof: Let g € (p{Y, v) and take any N' C N. Now, v{g |;v') = '^{9)~' i^eN\N' i^{g, v) 
{nf — d,N'{g))Yi{g,v) which implies Yi{g =  %{gi' )^ for all i G N'. Now
take any ij  G g Ia^ '. First assume that ni{g),rij{g) > 2. In this case, we have 
v{g U' - i j )  = v{g -  ij) -  Eiew\TV' v) = {n -  dM{g))Yi{g -  ij, v ) - { n - n ' -  
dN\N'ig))Yi{g,v). Since i G Dt i^{g |Af') does not imply that Yi{g l/v',u) = 0 when­
ever i ^ Dis!i{g), the last equality implies that Yi{g |at' —ij,v) =  Yj{g Iw' —ij,v) = 
-  ij, v) -  ?i{g, u)) -h Yi{g, v) < Yi{g, v) = Yi{g U', i;). The inequalityn'-df^,{g)
holds because Yi{g—ij, v)—Yi{g, ■u) < 0 due to the pairwise stability of g. Now with­
out loss of generality assume that Tij{g) > rii{g) =  1. Then, %{g jyv' —ij,v) =  0 <
%{g U', w) and Yj{g |yv- - i j , v )  = [Yj{g -  ij,v) -  Yj{g,v)) +  Yj{g,v) <
= yj{g U')^)· Therefore, g |at' is not defeated hy g' = g |a^< —ij  for 
any ij  E g |at'. N ow take any i , j  G N' such that ij  ^ g |ij. First assume that 
h j  e N{g). In this case, we have v{g |^/ +ij) = v{g + ij) -  'EieN\N> =
( n -  d liv {g))Yi{9 + ij,v) -  {n -n '  -  dpf\N>{g))Yi{g,v). Since there are n' -dN>{g) 
agents in N' to share this value, we have Yi{g |;v' +ij,v)  =  Yj{g U' +ij ,v)  = 
n-d i^g) + Yi{g,v) < Yi{g,v) = Yi{g |iv',ti)· Now withoutn'-df^,{g)
loss of generality assume that =  {i}. (Note that there can be at most one 
agent which is disconnected in g by Lemma 1, and since ^ is a pairwise stable 
graph, and Yi{g + ij, v) > Yi(g,v) = 0 we have that Yj(g-l· ij, v) < Yj(g, u)).Then, 
y(g U' + u ) =  ^(g+v)-'Ei6N\N' i^(g>i )^ =  ^^j(g-V,'t^)-(n-n')Yj(g,v) implying 
that Yj(g Iat/ +ij ,v) = ^(Yj(g+ij ,v)-Yj(g,v))+Yj(g,v)  < Yj(g,v) = Yj(g U/,u). 
Hence, g |;v' is not defeated hy g' = g |jv' +ij  for any i , j  G N' such that ij  ^ g |jv'· 
This completes the proof.
P roposition 2 There exists a component additive value function v such that the 
pairwise stability solution is not complement consistent with respect to v and Y  
when Y  is the equal split rule.
Proof: Let N  =  { i , j ,k ,v ,w}  and consider the component additive v such that 
v{{ij , jk}) = 3,v{{ij , jk, ik}) =  2,u({ii}) = l,u({utn}) =  10,v{{ i j , jk,vw,vi})  =  
v{{ i j , jk,vw,vj})  =  v{{ij , jk,vw,vk}) = v{{i j , jk,vw,wi})  = v{{ i j , jk,vw,wj})  = 
v{{i j , jk,vw,wk})  =  22. Assume that Y  = Y.  Then the graph g = { i j , jk ,vw}  is 
pairwise stable. Now, let N' = {j ,k,v,w}.  Then, g |at'=  { jk,vw},  and Yi{g,v) =  
|at', n) for every I G N' since the payoff of agent I in the restricted graph g [at' 
depends on v{h) where I G N{h) and h G C{g). Consider vj  and the payoffs of j  
and v: we have v{g |at' +vj) — v{g + jv) -  Yi{g,v) =  21 implying that Yj{g |yv'
10
+vj,v)  =  5 | > 1 = Yj{g and Y^ {g \n' +vj,v)  = 5 | > 5 = Y^ {g
Hence, g |//< is defeated hy g' = g |^/ -i-vj and g ip{Y,v). Therefore, pairwise 
stability is not complement consistent.
Lem ma 2 If v satisfies strict monotonicity, and the allocation rule is the Shapley 
value of the game 17, then the unique pairwise stable graph is the complete graph.
Proof: Let u be a strict monotonic value function and Yi{g, v) =  SVi{Uy^g). Assume 
there exists a pairwise stable graph g such that g ^ g^. Take any ij  ^ g. For 
every S C N \  i such that j  € S, we have Uy ,g+ij{S U {i}) > Uy g^{S U {*}) 
and Uy g^+ij{S) = Uy^ g{S). Since for all other subsets T C N \  i with j  ^ T, 
{U{T U {z}) — remains the same when g is changed to p + ij, we
have that SVi{Uy^g i^j) > SVi{Uy^g) and the same holds for agent j. Hence, g is 
defeated hy g' — g + ij  and g ^ ^{Y, v).
Proposition  3 If u satisfies strict monotonicity, and the allocation rule is the 
Shapley value of the game U, then pairwise stability solution satisfies complement 
consistency with respect to v and Y.
Proof: Let t; be a strict monotonic value function and Yi{g,v) = SVi{Uy g^). Then 
unique pairwise stable graph is g^ by the above lemma. Clearly, for every N' C N, 
we have g^ |at'=  g^'. Take any ij  G g^'. By the same argument used in the lemma 
above, g '^ defeats g =  g '^ — ij. Therefore, g '^ G ip{Y,v).
Lem ma 3 If u is not component additive and satisfies strict monotonicity, and 
the allocation rule is equal split, then g^ G ^{Y, v), i.e. complete graph is pairwise 
stable and the only other candidate g for pairwise stability is g^ '^  ^with DN{g) =  {z} 
for some i E N.
11
Proof: Assume that v is not component additive and satisfies strict monotonicity, 
and the allocation rule is equal split. It is trivial that complete graph is pairwise 
stable. (Consider and take any i , j  e N. Then, Yi{g^,v) = Yj{g^,v) =  >
■ = Yj{g^ — ij, v).) Now, consider the graph g = for some i. Since agent
i is disconnected, his payoff is zero. Take any agent j  E N \  {i}. By forming a link 
with agent i, agent j  may loose since the number of agents to share the value of 
the graph g + ij  (although v{g T ij) > v{g)) increases by one. If this is true for all 
the agents in \  z, then the graph g will be pairwise stable. (Note that g defeats 
also g — kl for any k,l E N \  i.) By using the same argument above, we conclude 
that no other graph can be pairwise stable. This completes the proof.
P roposition  4 Assume v is defined as (2.2). If v is not component additive and 
satisfies strict monotonicity, and the allocation rule is equal split, then pairwise 
stability solution is max consistent with respect to v and Y.
Proof: Assume that v is not component additive and satisfies strict monotonicity, 
and the allocation rule is equal split. We know from the above lemma that complete 
graph is pairwise stable. Take any N' C N. Since the term Y{9j '^he
equation of the reduced value function is constant and does not depend on g", 
g = {kl\k E N' and I E N \  N'} maximizes v{g') for every g' E G^'. This reduces 
max consistency to the complement consistency for the complete graph, and we also 
know from Proposition 1 that pairwise stability solution is complement consistent 
when V is not component additive. (The same argument applies when g = g^ '^  ^
with Df i^g) = {i} for some i E N is pairwise stable and i E N') Now assume 
g = g \^  ^with Dpf{g) = {z} for some i E N is pairwise stable and take any N' such 
that i E N \  N'. Then, g |w'= g '^ and v{g^') > v{g^' — kl) for any k,l E N' with
12
the number of agents remaining the same in both graphs. Therefore, g \n> is not 
defeated. This completes the proof.
P roposition  5 Assume v is defined as (2.3). There exists a strictly monotonic 
value function v, which is not component additive, such that the pairwise stability 
solution is not max consistent with respect to v and Y  when the allocation rule is 
equal split.
Proof: Let N = 8 and consider the following value function which is not compo­
nent additive and satisfies strict monotonicity: = 77 with Yi{g^ '^^ ,v) = 0
i.e. i is disconnected, and Yj{g '^ \^v) =  11 for every j  e N \ i ;  v{g^ '^^  -j- ij) = 80 
for every j  E N \  i such that Yk{g^ ^^  + ij,v) = 10 for all k E N. Hence, 
g (f(Y,v). Now, let N \  N' = {k,l ,m}  and _
Yk{g '^ \^v) =  56 -  11 = 45. (Note that v{g^ ' '^ |jv') is maximized through g" = 
{kj\j  E N' \  i} and N{g") \  N' =  {/t}.) Then we have Yj{g’^ '^ " \n ' , v ) = l l | .  
Now let v{g \^  ^ U' +ij)  =  + ij) -  ?k{g^\\v) = 7 1 -1 1  =  60. Then,
Yj{g \^  ^ U' +ij ,v)  = 12 > 11\ =  Hence, g^ \  ^ \n'  ^ <p{Y,v)·
13
Chapter 3
Population M onotonic Allocation  
Rules with respect to the 
Pairwise Stability Solution in 
Social and Economic Networks
3.1 Basic Notations and Definitions
Consider the case that there are new agent(s) joining the set of agents N. An 
allocation rule is population monotonic with respect to a solution concept if all 
agents in the initial group N  gain or all of them loose at the new solution outcome. 
In this section we will use the following notation: C g^} —>■ K, i.e. v is
defined for all set of players. Now, we can define population monotonicity formally:
Definition 13 Given a value function v, the allocation rule Y  satisfies popula­
tion momotonicity with respect to the solution y? : y x C — G if there exists
14
g G vm) and g' G (p{Y, v^ ji) with N C N' such that for any i E N, Yi{g, wat) ^  
Yi{g',VN')[Yi{g,v! )^ > Yi{g',vpf,)] implies Yj{g,VN) < Yj{g',VN')[Yj{g,vj^) > Yj{g',v! >^)] 
for all j  E N \  i.
3.2 Results
Proposition  6 There exists an anonymous value function v which is not compo­
nent additive such that equal split rule does not satisfy population monotonicity 
with respect to the pairwise stability solution.
Proof: Let N = {i , j } ,  N' = {i, j ,k},  and N" = {i , j ,k, l }.  Now consider the 
following (anonymous and not component additive) value function; =
— 2, VN'{g '^) =  1 and vi^{{ij,jk}) = 2. Then given N', the unique 
pairwise stable graph is ^ = {ij}· Now it is easily constructed such that, given N", 
the unique pairwise stable graph is g^" with VN"{g^") =  3. Here, one agent makes 
profit from joining agent I to N' (he receives |  instead of 0) but the other two 
agents loose in this case (they receive |  instead of 1). Therefore, equal split does 
not satisfy population monotonicity with respect to the pairwise stability solution.
P roposition  7 The equal split rule satisfies population monotonicity with respect 
to the pairwise stability solution when v is not component additive and v e V* = 
{v E l^lt;iv(^) = 0 if and only if DN{g) /  0}.
Proof: Assume v is not component additive and v E V* = {v E ^N(5 ) = 
0 if and only if D^ig) 7  ^ 0 }· In this case, any graph with d^ig) > 0 cannot be 
pairwise stable. Since also v is not component additive, every agent receives the 
same payoff in a pairwise stable graph. Hence, equal split rule satisfies population 
monotonicity with respect to the pairwise stability solution.
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Proposition  8 The equal split rule satisfies population monotonicity with respect 
to the pairwise stability solution when v is strictly monotonic.
Proof: Assume that v is strictly monotonic. Since complete graph is pairwise 
stable for every set of agents, when Y = Y  and v is strictly monotonic, by Lemma 
3, clearly, equal split rule satisfies population monotonicity with respect to the 
pairwise stability solution.
P roposition  9 There exists an anonymous value function v such that the Shapley 
allocation does not satisfy population monotonicity with respect to the pairwise 
stability solution.
Proof: Let v be anonymous and defined as follows: u({y}) =  v{{i j , jk, ik})  = 
v{{ i j , jk, ,kl , i l })  =  1, v{{ij,ik}) =  = v{{ij , jk,kl})  = v{{ij,kl}) =  2,
v{{i j , jk,kl , i l , ik})  = v{{ij, ik,il}) = v{{ij,ik, kl,il}) =  3. Then we have that 
(p{SV,VN={i,j)) =  {u}, and ‘p{SV,VN>={ij k^}) =  and <p{SV,VNn^ [ij k^,i}) =
{i j , jk,kl, i l , ik}.  But then
2
S V i{ ( p { S V , V N ' = [ i j ^ k } ) , V N ' = [ i , j , k ] )  =  1 >  S V i{ ( p { S V , V N " = { i , j , k , i } ) ,V N ' = { i j , k , i } )  =  ^  
whereas
1 5
SVj((p(SV,Vu' = {i,j,k}),V/v'={iJ,k}) =  2 < =  Q
. Hence, Shapley allocation does not satisfy population monotonicity with respect 
to the pairwise stability solution. (Note that g = { i j , jk}  is also pairwise stable 
since V is anonymous. But the result does not change, this time the payoff of j  
decreases whereas the payoff of i increases.)
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Conclusion
In this study we analyzed consistency and population monotonicity axioms in the 
context of graph structures. One of the main results is that pairwise stability 
solution appears to be complement consistent when the allocation rule is equal 
split and the value function is not component additive. But in case of component 
additivity of v, complement consistency is not attained. For max consistency, we 
found that monotonicity and again non-component additivity is crucial.
As far as the population monotonicity is concerned, we need more restrictions 
on the value functions. The equal split rule, for example, does not satisfy population 
monotonicity even if the value function is anonymous and not component additive. 
The Shapley value also does not satisfy population monotonicity when the value 
function is anonymous.
There are several directions in which this analysis can be extended. First, a 
stronger notion of stability appears to be central for further research. Secondly, the
17
allocation rule and value function can be characterized for the principles analyzed 
in this study.
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